<p >A new assessment by the Pentagon’s Defence Intelligence Agency has claimed that Russia has sent Patnsir air defence combat vehicles to North Korea, as part of expanding defence cooperation between the two countries. The paper assessed that the East Asian state had reached its <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/nkorea-reached-strongest-strategic-positionconcerned" >“strongest strategic position” </a>in decades, with its expanding access to Russian space, nuclear and missile applicable technology, expertise and materials, and considerable revenues from arms exports to Russia, considered to be among the important contributors to this position. The Pantsir system first entered service in the Russian Armed Forces in 2012, and is&nbsp;prized for its high mobility and versatility. The system has been intensively combat tested in Libya, Syria and Ukraine, and by the beginning of the 2020s had already shot down over 100 drones and at least one fighter. Its ability to provide a defence against Western radar evading cruise missiles such as the Storm Shadow have been <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/modifications-patnsir-efficiency-stormshadow" target="_blank">enhanced significantly</a> based on combat experience in the Ukrainian theatre. Representatives from the High Precision Weapons holding of the Russian state owned defence conglomerate Rostec previously summarised the enhancements made to the system as follows: “All necessary alterations have been introduced to the Pantsir-S system, making it possible to increase its efficiency against ‘difficult’ projectiles and long-range missiles, including the long-range, low-visibility Storm Shadow cruise missile. The results of its combat use have proven the correctness of previously made design decisions.”&nbsp;</p><p ><img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/02/article_683d5f0a88f179_24558211.jpg" title="Surface-to-Air Missile Launch From Pantsir Air Defence Combat Vehicle"></p><p >The Pantsir system has been widely exported to over a dozen clients across the world, and in the Russian Armed Forces is valued for providing a short range counterpart to<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-s400-integrate-nuclear-warheads" target="_blank"> long range systems </a>such as the S-400 and medium range systems such as the BuK-M2. A new variant of the system introduced in 2019, the Pantsir-SM, incorporated a number of new technologies, and integrated the new 57E6M surface-to-air missile as its primary armament. The missile increased the system’s engagement range from 20 to 30 kilometres, while allowing for targeting of aircraft and missiles at high 18,000 meter altitudes and providing an ability to engage at 31 percent higher speeds. The system also introduced new electronic warfare countermeasures, and had an increased detection range against fighter sized targets to 75 kilometres. New surface-to-air missiles on the system are complemented by the standard armament of two 2A38M 30mm anti-aircraft autocannon, which are considered particularly valuable for neutralising attacks by large numbers of low speed drones, and provide a secondary capability to engage infantry and light vehicles.</p><p ><img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/02/article_683d2fed32b606_38544572.jpg" title="Pantsir-SM Vehicle"></p><p >Despite its low cost and the benefits of intensive combat testing, it remains questionable whether North Korea would seek to procure Pantsir systems from Russia. The country’s own defence sector has proven capable of producing much higher end and more complex air defence systems indigenously, with the most notable example being the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/north-korea-test-firing-s400-similar-air-defence" target="_blank">Pyongae-6 </a>considered a direct analogue to the Russian S-400. In the past, as was the case with the S-300 derived Pyongae-5 system, the country sought to acquire armaments from Russia through large scale technology transfer deals and support for domestic license production. For relatively low end systems like the Pantsir, which were designed to be fielded in greater numbers, such an approach would be more in line with longstanding North Korean procurement trends. False reports of Russian arms transfers to North Korea have been made multiple times in the past, particularly since early 2024 when large scale North Korean arms sales to its neighbour were confirmed. A notable prior example was the highly dubious claim made in November 2024 by a number of Western sources that Russia had likely<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/claims-russian-s400-deliveries-nkorea" target="_blank"> transferred S-400</a> long range air defence systems to its neighbour, which appeared highly unlikely for a number of reasons.&nbsp;</p><p ><img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/02/article_683d301624e281_09168372.jpeg" title="North Korean Pyongae-6 Long Range Air Defence System"></p><p >Although there is significant room to doubt that North Korea has procured the Pantsir system, the possibility cannot be ruled out entirely. One possibility is that the Korean People’s Army placed a small order for the systems in order to test them more intensively under local conditions, allowing for an evaluation of whether large scale procurements under a licence production deal would be a favourable investment. These initial models could subsequently be used for training. Russia may also have made a licence production deal or various technology transfers conditional on North Korea first procuring a number of ‘off the shelf’ units. Another possibility is that the Korean People’s Army perceived an urgent need to enhance anti-drone capabilities in the inter-Korean Demilitarised Zone or around the capital Pyongyang, particularly after drones launched from South Korea in October 2024 <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/drone-propaganda-nkorea-air-defence" >penetrated</a> North Korean airspace to drop propaganda leaflets over the capital city Pyongyang. The operation was considered an unprecedented violation of the country’s otherwise highly secure airspace, and may have led an ‘off the shelf’ purchase to be seen as necessary. A further possibility is that the systems were provide as aid, with the intention of training Korean People’s Army units in North Korea for them to then use Pantsir systems on the frontlines in the Ukrainian theatre.&nbsp;</p>