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How Important Was the Siberian Bomber Base Hit By Ukraine? Tu-22M3 Fleet Set to Recover

<p >Following the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukraine-most-successful-strike-russian-bomber-bases" >successful initiation</a> of Operation Spider Web by the Ukrainian SBU on the afternoon of June 1, which saw <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukraine-most-successful-strike-russian-bomber-bases" target="_blank">large scale done strikes</a> launched from trucks within Russia against multiple major bomber bases, one of the most significant achievements of the operation was the unprecedented strike on the Belaya Airbase in the Irkutsk region, Siberia. Located more than 4000 kilometres from Ukraine, and approximately 300 kilometres from the Russian-Mongolian border, the ability to hold the airbase at risk served to highlight the limits of Russia’s highly prized strategic depth, and raises the potential of major industrial facilities, such as the Irkutsk Aviation Plant where Su-30 fighters are built, could be targeted in future attacks. Belaya Airbase was built in the late 1940s to host interceptors for air defence duties under the 350th Fighter Aviation Regiment, as part of a broader effort to increase the security of Soviet airspace. The contraction of the tactical combat aviation fleet after the end of the Cold War, however, has meant that the facility currently hosts no combat jets other than Tu-22M3 bombers. </p><p ><img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/03/article_683eb42394bb87_14612923.png" ></p><p >Belaya Airbase began to serve as a staging ground for Tu-4 strategic bomber deployments to China in 1954, in the immediate aftermath of the Korean War. Later that decade the facility was modernised and saw its runway paved to host a more permanent bomber presence. It began to host Tu-16 strategic bombers from 1958, including the enhanced Tu-16K variant from 1961, before transitioning to the Tu-22M2 some time before 1982. By 1982 the facility hosted two Tu-22M2 regiments, alongside the Tu-128 interceptors that had been based there since 1967. Production of the enhanced Tu-22M3 from 1989-1997 allowed all older medium range bombers to be phased out of service, with the Tu-22M3 being deployed to Belaya at some point during that period. The new bomber was powered by more modern NK-25 engines, and had reshaped air intakes and wings with greater maximum speed among other modifications that significantly improved its flight performance, and facilitated flight at speeds exceeding Mach 2. These upgrades also increased its range by one third compared to the Tu-22M2, while avionics were improved considerably. </p><p ><img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/03/article_683eb46f9a56a4_94341821.png" title="Tu-22M3 Bomber at Belaya Airbase"></p><p >Although cutting edge when introduced in the late 1980s, the capabilities of the Tu-22M3 deployed at Belaya Airbase under the 200th Guards Heavy Bomber Regiment have been considered increasingly out of date. A number of sources indicate that the Russian Defence Ministry previously planned to phase the aircraft out of service around 2030, and replace them with <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-doubled-su34-production" target="_blank">Su-34M strike fighters</a>, before they demonstrated their unique value during bombing operations against <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/uyghur-jihadists-senior-posts-syria-islamist-security-forces" target="_blank">Turkish-backed jihadist militants</a> in Syria from 2016. The Tu-22M3 fleet has since proven to be particularly valuable in the Ukrainian theatre, primarily due to the advanced capabilities of the Kh-22 cruise missile and the very large Soviet era reserves of the missiles which the Russian Armed Forces retained from that period. The <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/kh22-strikes-impossible-air-defence-desperate">difficulties</a> which Tu-22M3 strikes using Kh-22 missiles caused for the Ukrainian Armed Forces were highlighted in December 2023 by Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson Yury Ignat, who observed that over the past 22 months Russian forces had fired approximately 300 of the missiles, and that Ukrainian air defences had not been able to intercept a single one. Ignat had previously stated in January that year: “I emphasise that it is impossible to shoot down Kh-22 missiles with the means we have in our arsenal,” highlighting the missile’s sheer speed as a primary reason.</p><p ><img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/03/article_683eb48d475ec9_31193390.png" title="Tu-22M3 Bomber at Belaya Airbase"></p><p >The low priority allocated to the Tu-22M3 was highlighted in the late 2010s when it was revealed that plans to modernise the aircraft to the Tu-22M3M standard had been scaled back considerably, with only a small portion of the fleet expected to be refurbished. The parameters of the upgrade package were also scaled back, with plans to integrate new NK-32-02 engines, the same as the engines used on the new Tu-160M bomber, having been cancelled. The upgrade package nevertheless remains costly, and includes replacing or upgrading 80 percent of avionics, and integrating SVP-24-22 bombsights, a GLONASS navigation system, a modern digital glass cockpit, new electronic warfare systems, and an NV-45 phased array radar, while also extending the bombers’ service lives to 45 years. Without these upgrades, losses among the bombers at Belaya Airbase remain relatively easy to replace, with over 50 Tu-22M3 airframes estimated to be in storage. The remoteness of Belaya Airbase makes it one of the less significant bomber facilities with Russia, as reflected by its remote location and the lack of larger intercontinental range bombers at the facility. The most significant consequence of the attack on the facility is thus likely to be the shaping of Russian confidence that the sheer size of its territory shields major facilities from being targeted, which may have been intended to have a psychological impact on the Russian leadership. </p>