Russian Army Captures Two of Ukraine’s Last Abrams Tanks Intact: Why Were They Abandoned?

<p >Two of the Ukrainian Army’s last remaining M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks have been captured by the Russian Army near the frontlines in the Sumy region, with footage confirming that the vehicles were abandoned relatively intact. Personnel operating under the 22nd Motor Rifle Regiment captured the vehicles, after reconnaissance teams secured the area against drones and explosives, with a repair unit subsequently assigned to transport the vehicles to rear positions. Two MaxxPro armoured vehicles, one Stryker infantry fighting vehicle, and a Challenger armoured recovery vehicle, were also captured as part of the same operation. These successes were gained as the Russian Army has made considerable advances into Sumy, capturing multiple settlements, with orders from the Kremlin having been issued to establish a buffer zone in the area. The capture of two intact Abrams tanks has fuelled considerable speculation regarding why they may have been abandoned, with a possibility remaining that the vehicles broke down or ran out of fuel.</p><p ><img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/05/article_6841b63bd09994_07935331.png" title="Captured Ukrainian Army Abrams Tank in Sumy">The Abrams is one of two tank classes alongside the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/t80-new-variants-production-restart" target="_blank">Russian T-80</a> that uses a <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-resumed-production-turbine-t80" target="_blank">gas-turbine engine</a>, which provides high levels of mobility, but also imposes considerable maintenance requirements and high fuel consumption levels on its operators. As the heaviest operational tank class in the world, the Abrams weighs approximately 50 percent more than the T-80, with its fuel consumption rates accordingly being significantly higher than other classes. This has long been highlighted as a leading potential shortcoming which could hinder the tank’s utility in the event of a protracted conflict against a near-peer adversary. Ukrainian personnel have highlighted <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/dissatisfied-abrams-losses-technical-issues">dissatisfaction</a> with the Abrams’ performance on multiple occasions, citing both technical issues such as vulnerability of electronic components to condensation, as well as their vulnerability to Russian fire. Serious shortages of high explosive rounds for the tank’s 120mm gun have also been a major issue affecting the Abrams and other Western-supplied main battle tanks in the theatre, which are not compatible with the 125mm tank rounds widely used by the Ukrainian Army. </p><p ><img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/05/article_6841b70ddaa791_88440995.png" title="Capture and Recovery of Ukrainian Army Abrams Tank in Sumy"></p><p >Despite only 31 Abrams tanks having been delivered to Ukraine, Russian Army units have captured the vehicles on multiple occasions in the past. In early September 2024 an Abrams tank was filmed <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/captures-leopard2a6-abrams">being captured</a> and towed away by Russian forces near the town of Avdiivka alongside a Leopard 2A6 tank, while the following month an Abrams tank operated by the 47th Mechanised Brigade was <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/capture-abrams-pokrovsk-ukraine">captured</a> near the city of Pokrovsk. As early as February that year, footage of the first combat operations by a Ukrainian Army Abrams tank against Russian forces <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/new-footage-shows-ukraine-s-u-s-supplied-abrams-tanks-in-first-combat-images-indicate-possible-combat-loss">showed</a> an apparently abandoned tank moving on roads in a landscape surrounded by shell holes and broken trees, although it remains uncertain whether the vehicle may have subsequently been captured. Currently under 10 Abrams tanks are estimated to remain in service in the Ukrainian Army, with most of the kills filmed against the vehicles having been achieved <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-army-takes-out-another-ukrainian-abrams-tank-with-guided-artillery-shot">by guided artillery</a> or <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/footage-taking-out-abrams-ukraine">by single use ‘kamikaze’ drones</a>, although one of the tanks was confirmed to have been <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-t72b3-abrams-ukraine">destroyed by a Russian T-72B3</a> tank after the two exchanged fire near Avdiivka. The Abrams’ sheer size has reportedly led the fleet to attract particularly high quantities of fire, with their profiles being far larger than those of Ukraine’s Soviet-built tanks <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-lancet-t80-kursk">such as the T-80s</a> and T-64, or than tanks operated by the Russian Army.</p><p ><img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/05/article_6841b6c27ddce7_66425371.jpeg" title="Capture of Abrams Tank Near Pokrovsk"></p><p >Abrams tanks were <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/new-footage-shows-ukraine-s-u-s-supplied-abrams-tanks-in-first-combat-images-indicate-possible-combat-loss">first seen</a> deployed to engage Russian forces on February 23, with the first loss <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/footage-destruction-abrams-ukraine">confirmed</a> three days afterwards, followed by a period of intensive losses lasting over a month. The vehicles were temporarily <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukrainian-army-withdraws-abrams-losses">withdrawn</a> from the frontlines in April, and had their armour protection levels improved domestically, although they would continue to suffer rapid attrition in subsequent engagements. American and Ukrainian sources have consistently reflected poorly on the Abrams’ performance in the Ukrainian theatre. In December 2024 U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan concluded that the vehicles were “not useful” for Ukraine’s war effort. When asked whether the Biden administration could have better prepared Ukraine for <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/leo2a6-destroyed-ukraine-bradleys">offensives</a> against Russian forces, he cited the Abrams as an example of how many kinds of American weapons did not have the desired impact in the theatre. “When it comes to Abrams tanks, we sent Abrams tanks to Ukraine… These Abrams tank units are actually undermanned because it’s not the most useful piece of equipment for them in this fight,” he stated. </p><p ><img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/05/article_6841b6e2ca4d01_76019569.png" title="Ukrainian Abrams Tank Hit By Precision Guided Artillery Early May"></p><p >Speaking regarding the Abrams’ limitations, U.S. Undersecretary for Defence for Policy Colin Kahl similarly observed: “The challenge with the Abrams is, it’s expensive. It’s difficult to train on. It is very difficult to sustain. It has a huge, complicated turbine engine that requires jet fuel… Frankly, our assessment is just that the Abrams is not the right capability at this time.” This mirrored <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/challenger2-good-for-ukraine-donbas" >similar criticisms</a> regarding other Western tank classes supplied to Ukraine. Following mounting revelations regarding Ukrainian units’ dissatisfaction with the vehicles, an unnamed Australian defence official speaking to the Australian Broadcasting Corporation noted regarding the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/us-blocking-australia-abrams-ukraine" >possibility</a> of Australia delivering new Abrams tanks to the country: “We are starting to doubt if the Ukrainians actually want these vehicles — the tank roof is the weakest point of the Abrams and this is a drone war.” Despite serious questions having been raised regarding the effectiveness of Western tanks in the Ukrainian theatre, NATO members’ supplies of Soviet tanks have become increasingly scarce, with the T-64 that formed the backbone of the Ukrainian fleet being highly scarce outside the country, while stocks of the widely operated T-72 have largely been exhausted outside Poland. With Ukraine’s own tank production capacity having been seriously diminished after the USSR’s disintegration, and subsequently effectively disappeared, supplies of Western vehicles remains effectively the only means of replenishing armour losses.</p>