The Russian Army is Now Extremely Reliant North Korean Supplies: Frontline Use of Korean Mortars Confirmed

New images from the frontlines of the Russian-Ukrainian War have confirmed the induction of North Korean made 60mm mortars into Russian Army service, and their use by regular units. Alongside its deployment of the world’s largest arsenals of towed, mobile and rocket artillery, the Korean People’s Army’s use of mortars is also thought to be extensive, including heavy 82mm, 120mm and 160mm systems, and lighter systems, all of which are produced in the country on significant scales alongside their munitions. North Korean units used M2 mortars as early as the Korean War, and have since developed more advanced successors, which are reported to be standard equipment in light infantry battalions. Due to the sharp contraction both of Russia’s defence sector and of its ground forces in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s disintegration, the country not only fields mortar and artillery systems in just a fraction of the numbers that North Korea does, but is also estimated to have much lower productive capacities. The&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/u-s-army-chiefs-stress-importance-of-artillery-as-key-lesson-of-ukraine-war" target="_blank">central importance</a> that these systems have had in the Ukrainian theatre has thus made the ability to procure equipment from the East Asian state particularly invaluable for the Russian war effort.&nbsp;<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/03/article_683f04a4c5f5f9_49225953.jpg" title="Russian Army 152mm Self-Propelled Howitzers">North Korean arms supplies to Russia reportedly began in 2022 with large scale procurements of small arms and other ground forces equipment by the Wagner Group contractor firm, before processing to procurements by the Russian Defence Ministry itself and orders for increasingly high end systems. By the second quarter of 2025, Western sources estimated that nearly half of artillery rounds used by the Russian Army were of North Korean origin, with <a href="https://www.opensourcecentre.org/research/brothers-in-arms">shipments</a> of rounds in the tens of millions alone estimated to have generated billions of dollars in revenues for the country’s defence sector. The results of an investigation by Reuters published in April <a href="https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/NORTHKOREA-RUSSIA/lgvdxqjwbvo/">highlighted</a> that many Russian artillery units had come to rely almost entirely on ammunition supplied by North Korea, with at least six Russian artillery units sourcing between 50 and 100 percent of their munitions from the country. North Korea which was estimated to have shipped 4-6 million shells to Russia in 2024, where Russian industry, by contrast, was estimated to have produced a maximum of 2.3 million artillery shells that year. “Without help from the DPRK, the Russian army shelling of Ukrainian defensive positions would have been cut in half,” the Ukrainian GUR military intelligence agency informed Reuters at the time.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/03/article_683f04e8ddca24_87708321.png" title="North Korean Bulsae-4 Launch and Explosion From Targeting Ukrainian Howitzer">North Korean <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-expecting-heavy-artillery-missile-reinforcements-nkorea">support</a> for the Russian war effort has come not only in the form of munitions supplies, but also with the introduction of new kinds of weapons systems which in many cases provide new capabilities not matched by those made in Russia. In January 2024 North Korean KN-23B ballistic missile systems <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/nkorean-kn23b-ballistic-strikes-ukraine" target="_blank">began to be utilised</a> in the Ukrainian theatre, and <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/move-aside-iskander-kn23b-russia-top" target="_blank">provided</a> a significantly higher payload and 60 percent greater range than the competing Iskander-M system developed by Russia. The systems thus not only increased the volume of tactical ballistic missile strikes that could be launched against Ukrainian targets, but also the ranges at which the could be launched and the kinds of targets that could be neutralised. In August 2024 the North Korean&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/nkorean-bulsae4-antitank-takes-out-ukraine-artillery-kursk">Bulsae-4 anti tank missile system</a> was&nbsp;<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/08/north-korea-closes-russias-anti-tank-missile-gap-with-ukraine/">first seen in use</a>&nbsp;in the theatre, and introduced a very long 10 kilometre range and top attack capability previously not seen on Russian systems of its kind. Subsequent footage has also appeared to show the&nbsp;<a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/footage-first-transfers-nkorean-russia-pukkuksong2">deployment</a>&nbsp;of North Korean Pukkuksong-2 medium range ballistic missile systems in Russia, which have sufficiently long ranges to strike targets across Europe from continental Russia. Russia has no indigenous equivalent to the system.<img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/06/03/article_683f051b616609_97900358.jpeg" title="Korean People`s Army 170mm Howtizers During Exercises">North Korea was in November 2024 confirmed to have <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/nkorean-koksan-170mm-ukraine" >begun transferring </a>170mm self-propelled howitzers, which are of a <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/world-s-biggest-guns-north-korea-s-massive-koksan-howitzers-and-the-evolution-of-the-country-s-strike-capabilities" >higher calibre </a>than any other widely fielded gun type in the world, and form the backbone of Korean People’s Army artillery units. Preceding this delivery, approximately 75 percent of North Korean howitzer rounds shipped to Russia were of a 152mm calibre, with the remainder being 122mm rounds. Deliveries of 170mm rounds were likely to have begun in late 2024. Although North Korean artillery rounds are known to primarily be used by Russian forces, a leading uncertainty surrounding many of the complete systems such as the Bulsae-4 and the 170mm guns delivered is whether they are primarily employed on the frontlines by Korean People’s Army personnel, or whether Russian personnel have been trained to utilise them. North Korean forces have been <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-details-nkorea-role-repelling-kursk" >confirmed</a> by both countries to have played a major role in hostilities between Russian and Ukrainian forces in the Russian Kursk region, which Ukraine launched a <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ukraine-twin-assaults-kursk-belogrod" target="_blank">large scale assault </a>against in August 2024. It remains highly possible, however, that North Korean specialists have also been deployed to support the use of complex systems like the KN-23B and Bulsae-4 on other frontiers such as in the Donbas regions. The discrepancy in industrial output between Russia and North Korea for many kinds of armaments is expected to continue to increase the Russian Army’s reliance on equipment procured from its neighbour, with the diversity of equipment supplied by the East Asian state expected to grow, while the revenues from the Ukrainian conflict have the potential to provide unprecedented profits to its defence sector and its tech sector more broadly.&nbsp;