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Will Russia’s New Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle Soon Enter Service? Evaluating the T-15’s Capabilities

<p >A decade ago in 2015 the Russian Armed Forces unveiled T-15 infantry fighting vehicle, which alongside the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russias-t14-turret-revolutionary-improvement" target="_blank">T-14 Armata tank</a>, the 2S35 Koalitsiya send propelled howitzer, and other advanced ground forces equipment displayed at the time appeared poised to tremendously enhance the Russian Army’s fighting capabilities. A decade later, however, either the T-14 nor the T-15 have entered service, with the futures of both programs increasingly left in doubt, while the 2S35 is fielded only in very limited numbers, and joined the Army only in 2023. Based on the same chassis as the T-14, and weighing a tremendous 48 tons, the T-15 is one of the heaviest vehicles of its kind in the world and represents a radical departure from its predecessors in Russian service. The T-15 lacks the T-14’s unmanned turret, and has an engine relocated to the front to allow personnel to embark in the rear. This mirrors the approach taken in developing the Israeli Namer infantry fighting vehicle, which was similarly developed as a derivative of a main battle tank design, the Merkava, and places the engine in the front to increase protection for personnel against frontal attacks. Although it is several decades older, the Namer is currently the only  widely fielded vehicle which can been considered broadly a counterpart to the T-15, with both having been designed with maximum protection, including in urban warfare scenarios in mind. </p><p ><img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/05/23/article_683016cd3ccf86_22875057.jpg" title="T-15 Fighting Vehicle with 30mm Cannon"></p><p >The T-15 is capable of carrying up to twelve personnel including three crew members. Its use of the same 1500hp engine as the T-14 facilitates very high levels of mobility despite its weight, including an off road maximum speed of 70 kilometres power hour. The vehicle uses the same Afganit Active Protection System as the T-14, with millimetre wave radars relied on to detect incoming missiles and shells, and deploying “soft kill” smoke grenades from four launchers to disrupt visual and infrared guidance systems. Five tubes on the vehicle’s hull also house interceptors to protect against incoming attacks. The T-15 also uses the same Malakhit dual layered reactive armour as the T-14, which makes use of explosives to blast outwards shortly before a shell or missile hits the vehicle’s hull. This triggers  the warhead of an incoming projectile prematurely and thereby limiting its destructive potential. The Malakhit system is considered a successor to the Kontakt-5 and Relikt systems that have been extensively combat tested in the Ukrainian theatre. </p><p ><img src="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/m/articles/2025/05/23/article_683016f6db26c0_35066861.JPG" title="T-14 Tank"></p><p >The course of hostilities in Ukraine has demonstrated that a primary role of armour remains to provide support to infantry and counter enemy infantry, rather than to engage enemy armour. Fo such roles, the T-15’s armament of 57mm autocannon, Kornet anti-tank missiles, and a 7.62 mm machine gun, is likely to prove sufficient. The cannon benefits from an unmanned modular design, and replaced a smaller 30mm autocannon seen on earlier prototypes. It enables the T-15 to neutralise light structures and medium vehicles. Although the T-15’s design appears to make it a highly potent class of infantry fighting vehicle,  procurement on a significant scale may prove to be cost prohibitive, with its production cost estimated to be comparable to that of a main battle tank such as the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/t90m-ukrainian-forces-destroy-tank-donbas" target="_blank">T-90M</a>. With the vehicle having yet to enter service over a decade after its unveiling, its future is in many ways even less certain that that of the T-14. While the allocation of significant funds to procure very high performing main battle tanks would be far from unprecedented, financing procurement of a very costly infantry fighting vehicle appears less likely. Nevertheless, the T-15’s commonality of maintenance and common production line with the T-14 could lead the Russian Army to procure limited numbers should the service eventually procure the T-14, with the fielding of the vehicles in active service potentially paying for itself should they come to attract export orders. Procurement in limited numbers for elite Guards units, and procurement of a specialised command post variant, remains a distinct possibility.</p>