Warsaw Uprising

2008/9 Schools Wikipedia Selection. Related subjects: World War II

Warsaw Uprising
Part of AK " Operation Tempest", World War II
Polish Home Army positions, outlined in red, on day 4 ( August 4, 1944).
Date 1 August — 2 October 1944 Location Warsaw, Poland Result German pyrrhic victory, Uprising quelled
Belligerents
Poland	Nazi Germany
Commanders
Tadeusz Komorowski  # Antoni "Monter" Chruściel  # Tadeusz Pełczyński	Erich von dem Bach Rainer Stahel Heinz Reinefarth Bronislav Kaminski † Petro Dyachenko
Strength
47,500 troops	25,000 troops (initially)
Casualties and losses
Berling 1st Army: 5,660 Casualties Polish Insurgents: 15,200 killed, 5,000 wounded, 15,000 taken prisoner Civilians: 200,000 killed 700,000 expelled from the city	16,000 killed, 9,000 wounded, 300 tanks and armored cars, 340 trucks and cars, 22 light artillery pieces

Operation Tempest Volhynia – Kowel – Łuck – Równe – Włodzimierz Wołyński – Lubartów – Kock – Operation Ostra Brama – Krawczuny – Miedniki – Rudniki Forest – Lwów Uprising – Jodła – Ceber – Warsaw Uprising

Warsaw Uprising

Prelude - The Battle Lack of outside support Capitulation - Aftermath Planned destruction Cultural representations Military units - Notable people Atrocities

The Warsaw Uprising (Powstanie Warszawskie) was a World War II struggle by the Polish Home Army (Armia Krajowa) to liberate Warsaw from German occupation. The Uprising began on August 1, 1944, as part of a nationwide rebellion, Operation Tempest. It was intended to last for only a few days until the Soviet Army would reach the city. The Soviet advance stopped short, however, while Polish resistance against the German forces continued for 63 days (until October 2).

The Uprising began at a crucial juncture as the Soviet Army was approaching Warsaw. The Uprising's chief objective was to drive the German occupiers from the city, helping with the larger fight against the Axis. Secondary political objectives were to liberate Warsaw before the Red Army arrived, so as to underscore Polish sovereignty, and to undo the Allied division of Central Europe into spheres of influence. Polish authorities were to reappear in liberated Warsaw and challenge the Soviet puppet government that was to rule Poland.

By September 16, 1944, Soviet forces had reached a point a few hundred metres from the city, across the Vistula River, but they made no further headway during the Uprising leading to allegations that Joseph Stalin had wanted the insurrection to fail.

Polish losses amounted to 18,000 soldiers killed and 25,000 wounded, in addition to between 120,000 and 200,000 civilian deaths, mostly from mass murders conducted by retreating German troops. German casualties totalled over 17,000 soldiers killed and over 9,000 wounded. During the urban combat approximately 25% of Warsaw's buildings were destroyed. Following the surrender of Polish forces on October 2, German troops systematically burned the city block by block. Together with earlier damage suffered in 1939 and during the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (1943), over 85% of the city had been destroyed. By January 1945, when the Soviets finally entered the city, Warsaw had practically ceased to exist.

Eve of battle

“	If not for Warsaw in the General Government, we wouldn't have 4/5 of our current problems on that territory. Warsaw was and will be the centre of chaos and a place from which opposition spreads throughout the rest of the country.	”
—German Governor-General Hans Frank Kraków, December 14, 1943

The Warsaw Uprising, or at least some form of insurrection in Poland, had been planned long in advance. From its inception, the Home Army was planning a national uprising against the German forces. Initial plans created by the Polish government-in-exile in 1942 assumed that the Allied invasion of Europe would lead to the withdrawal of considerable German forces from the Eastern Front for the defence of the Third Reich. The Home Army would act to prevent troop transfer to the west and to allow the British and American forces to seize Germany by breaking all communication links with the majority of the German forces massed in the Soviet Union.

The Home Army's initial plans for a national uprising, Operation Tempest, which would link up with Western Allies forces, changed in 1943 when the situation on the Eastern Front made it apparent that the Red Army, rather than the Western Allies, would force the Germans from Poland. By 1943 it was clear that the allied invasion of Europe would not come in time, and that in all probability the Red Army would reach the pre-war borders of Poland before the invasion could make notable headway. In February 1943, General Stefan Rowecki amended the plan. The Uprising was to be started in three phases, the first being in the East (with main centres of resistance in Lwów and Wilno), before the advancing Red Army. The second part was to include armed struggle in the belt between the Curzon Line and the Vistula river, while the third phase was to be a nationwide uprising throughout Poland. Warsaw was chosen, partially, because of its status as a pre-war capital and partly because it was assumed that the Germans would wish to hold onto the city for as long as possible, as a tool for morale boosting, and as a base for communications, supply, and troop movements.

The Polish government-in-exile carried out frantic diplomatic efforts to gain support from their allies prior to the start of battle. However the Allies support for the Polish resistance was not high on the priority list. The Polish government in London asked the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the Foreign Office several times for an allied mission to be sent to Poland; since such missions had already been dispatched to all other resistance movements in Europe, such as Albania, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, Italy, Norway, Yugoslavia. However, the Polish pleas were not heeded until December 1944.

For the Soviets, this represented more of a hindrance than a help. Polish-Soviet relations were broken off on April 25, 1943 as a result of the Katyn massacre and Soviet partisans often clashed with Polish partisans. It became obvious that the advancing Red Army might not come to Poland as a liberator but rather, as General Stefan Grot-Rowecki put it, as "our Allies' ally." On November 26, 1943, the Polish government-in-exile issued an instruction to the effect that if diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were not resumed before the Soviet entry into Poland, Home Army forces were to remain underground pending further decisions. However, the Home Army commander took a different approach, and on November 30, 1943, the final version of the plan, which became known as Operation Tempest, was devised. Although doubts existed about the military wisdom of a major uprising, planning continued nonetheless.

The situation came to a head on 13 July as Operation Bagration, the Soviet offensive, crossed the old Polish border. At this point the Poles had to make a decision: either initiate the uprising in the current difficult political situation and risk problems with Soviet support, or fail to rebel and face Soviet propaganda describing Armia Krajowa as collaborators and ineffective cowards. The plan was intended both as a political manifestation of the influence of Polish Government in Exile and as a direct operation against German occupiers. The fear was that in the aftermath of the war the Allies would ignore the legal London-based government. It was clear both that Poland would be 'liberated' by the Red Army, and that the Soviet Union did not recognise the Government-in-Exile. The urgency for this decision increased as it became clear that after any successful Polish-Soviet co-operation in the liberation of various towns (for example, in the Operation Ostra Brama), the Soviet NKVD units who followed behind would either shoot or arrest most Polish officers and those Polish soldiers who could not or would not join the Soviet controlled forces. Following a flood of reports from the eastern territories about forced demilitarisation, trials and execution of Home Army soldiers by the Soviets, on 21 July 1944 the High Command of the Home Army decided to expand the scope of Operation Tempest to include Warsaw itself. The date for the Warsaw Uprising was set as 1 August. On 25 July the Polish government in exile in London approved the planned uprising in Warsaw.

In the early summer of 1944, German planning required Warsaw to serve as the defensive centre of the area and to be held at all costs. The Germans had fortifications constructed and built up their forces in the area. This process slowed after the failed July 20 Plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler, but by late July 1944, German forces had almost reached their full strength again. On July 27, the head of the General Government, Hans Frank, called for 100,000 Polish men between the ages of 17–65 to present themselves at several designated meeting places in Warsaw the following day, as part of the plan which envisaged the Poles constructing fortifications for the Wehrmacht in and around the city. The Home Army viewed this move as an attempt to neutralise the underground forces, and the underground urged Warsaw inhabitants to ignore it. Fearing German reprisals following the ignored order, and believing that time was of the essence, General Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski ordered full mobilisation of Home Army forces in the Warsaw area on 1 August 1944.

This mobilization decision had some key ramifications for the Soviet Union. Stalin decried for not being officially consulted on the uprising and thus suspected subterfuge from his Western allies. In retrospect, both sides were jockeying for regional political alignment, with the Polish Home Army's desire for a pro-Western Polish government and the Soviet's intention of establishing a Polish Communist regime.

The official Soviet propaganda line tried to portray the Polish underground as "waiting with their arms at ease" and not fighting the common enemy. As the Soviet forces approached Warsaw in June and July 1944, Soviet radio stations demanded a full national uprising in Warsaw to cut the communication lines of German units still on the right bank of the Vistula; just two days prior to the uprising, Soviet-controlled radio Kosciuszko had called for the Polish people to rise in arms. On July 29 , 1944, the first Soviet armoured units reached the outskirts of Warsaw, but were counter-attacked by German 39th Panzer Corps, comprising 4th Panzer Division, 5th SS Panzer Division, 19th Panzer Division, and the Hermann Goering Panzer Division. By 10 August, in the ensuing battle of Radzymin, the Germans had enveloped and inflicted heavy casualties on the Soviet 3rd Tank Corps at Wołomin, 15 kilometres outside Warsaw.

Opposing forces

Poles

The Home Army forces of the Warsaw District numbered about 45,000 soldiers, of which 23,000 were equipped and combat-ready; about 2,500 further soldiers came from the ranks of other formations like the far-right Narodowe Siły Zbrojne and the communist Armia Ludowa. Most of them had trained for several years in partisan and urban guerrilla warfare, but lacked experience in prolonged daylight fighting. The forces lacked equipment, especially since the Home Army had shuttled weapons and men to the east of the city before the decision on 21 July to include Warsaw in Operation Tempest. A number of other partisan groups also subordinated themselves to Home Army command for the uprising. Many volunteers, including some Jews freed from the concentration camp in the ruins of the Warsaw Ghetto, joined during the fighting.

General Antoni Chruściel, codename 'Monter', commanded the Polish forces in Warsaw. Initially he divided his forces into eight areas:

• Area I ( Śródmieście, Old Town)
• Area II ( Żoliborz, Marymont, Bielany)
• Area III ( Wola)
• Area IV ( Ochota)
• Area V ( Mokotów)
• Area VI (Praga)
• Area VII ( Powiat Warszawski)
• Zgrupowanie Kedywu Komendy Głównej

On September 20 a re-organisation of this structure took place to align with the structure of Polish forces fighting with the Western Allies. The entire force, renamed the Warsaw Home Army Corps (Warszawski Korpus Armii Krajowej) and commanded by General Antoni Chruściel (Monter), formed into three infantry divisions.

As of August 1 their military supplies consisted of:

• 1,000 rifles
• 1,700 pistols
• 300 machine pistols
• 60 submachine guns
• 7 machine guns (medium or light, such as the MG 42)
• 35 anti-tank guns and anti-tank rifles (including several PIATs)
• 25,000 hand grenades (mainly of the 'stick' variety).

In the course of the fighting the Poles obtained further supplies through airdrops and by capture from the enemy (including several armoured vehicles). Also, the insurgents’ workshops worked busily throughout the uprising, producing 300 automatic pistols, 150 flame-throwers, 40,000 grenades, a number of mortars, and even an armoured car ( Kubuś).

Germans

In late July the German units stationed in and around Warsaw were divided into three categories. The first - and the most numerous - was the garrison of Warsaw. As of July 31, 1944, it numbered some 11,000 troops under General Rainer Stahel. These forces included:

• Approximately 5,000 regular troops
• 4,000 Luftwaffe personnel (1,000 at Okęcie airport, 700 at Bielany, 1,000 in Boernerowo, 300 at Służewiec and 1,000 in anti-air artillery posts throughout the city
• Approximately 2,000 men of the Wachtregiment Warschau (German: Sentry Regiment Warsaw), including four infantry battalions (Patz, Baltz, No.996 and No.997), an SS reconnaissance squadron (ca. 350 men), factory guards, Andrey Vlasov's men, Turkmmen and other auxiliary troops.

These well-equipped German forces had been prepared for the defence of the city's key positions for many months. Several hundred concrete bunkers and barbed wire lines protected the buildings and areas occupied by the Germans.

Apart from the garrison itself, there were numerous units stationed on both banks of the Vistula or moving through the city in both directions. These comprised some 15,000 to 16,000 Wehrmacht soldiers. Also, at least 90,000 additional German troops were available from occupation forces in the surrounding area.

The second category was formed by police and SS under Col. Paul Otto Geibel, numbering initially 5,710 men. These included three Schutzpolizei battalions (1,000 men) and two Sauferkaserne SS battalions (1,000 men), as well as reserve companies (300 men), an SA battalion (400 men), military police, Ordnungspolizei, Sicherheitspolizei, training units and many smaller units up to 400 men strong.

The third category was formed by various sentry and guard units, altogether some 3,500 men strong. Among them were detachments of the Bahnschutz (rail guard), Werkschutz (factory guard) and a transport protection battalion.

In the course of the uprising the German side received reinforcements on a daily basis. As of August 23, 1944, the German units directly involved with fighting in Warsaw included:

• Battle Group Rohr (commanded by Major General Rohr)
• Battle Group Reinefarth (commanded by SS-Gruppenführer Heinz Reinefarth)
  • Attack Group Dirlewanger Brigade
  • Attack Group Reck (commanded by Major Reck)
  • Attack Group Schmidt (commanded by Colonel Schmidt)
  • Various support and backup units
• Warsaw Garrison (Group of Warsaw Commandant) commanded by Lieutenant General Stahel

The rising

W-hour

After days of hesitation, at 17:30 on July 31st, the Polish headquarters scheduled "W-hour" (from the Polish wybuch, "outbreak"), the moment of the start of the uprising, for 17:00 of the following day. The decision proved to be a costly strategic mistake as the under-equipped Polish forces were prepared for a series of coordinated surprise night attacks and the daylight exposed them to German machine gun fire. Although a large number of the partisan units were already mobilized and waiting at assembly points throughout the city, the mobilization of thousands of young men and women was hard to conceal and fighting started in advance of "W-hour", notably in the boroughs of Żoliborz, Mokotów and Czerniaków, around Napoleon Square, in the vicinity of the Hale Mirowskie and Plac Kercelego marketplaces, and at Okopowa street.

Until "W-hour" these incidents were not generally perceived as part of a larger plan. However, at around 16:00, SS-Standartenfuhrer Paul Otto Geibel, chief of police and SS in the Warsaw District, received a warning about the uprising from an anonymous 'lieutenant of the Luftwaffe', who had in turn been warned about it by a Polish woman. He alerted the units under his command, which thus were prepared for the assault at 17:00. This drastically reduced the element of surprise for the insurgents. On the other hand, while the Germans had been considering the possibility of an uprising, they had no operational plans to meet such an occurrence.

Under these circumstances the coordinated attacks on the German outposts and garrisons were largely successful. The first two days were crucial in establishing the battlefield for the rest of the fight. Most successes were achieved in the city centre ( Śródmieście) and the old town ( Stare Miasto) and the nearby boroughs of Wola, where most objectives were captured, although several major German strongholds remained, and in some areas of Wola Poles sustained heavy losses that forced them to retreat early on. In other areas such as Mokotów the attackers almost completely failed to secure any of their objectives and controlled only the residential areas. In Praga, on the eastern bank of the Vistula river, the concentration of German forces was so high that the Poles fighting there were quickly forced back into hiding. Most crucially, the fighters in different areas failed to link up, either with each other or with areas outside Warsaw, leaving each section of the city isolated from the others.

After the first hours of fighting many units adopted a more defensive strategy while the civilian population started erecting barricades throughout the city. Despite all the problems, by August 4 most of the city lay in Polish hands.

First four days

The uprising was intended to last a few days until Soviet forces arrived; however, this never happened, and the Polish forces had to fight with little outside assistance. The results of the first two days of fighting in different parts of the city were as follows:

• Area I (city centre and the Old Town): Units captured most of their assigned territory, but failed to capture areas where there were strong German pockets of resistance (the Warsaw University buildings, PAST skyscraper, or the headquarters of the German garrison in the Saxon Palace). They thus failed to create a central stronghold and secure communication links to other areas. The main failures were in not establishing a secure land connection with the northern area of Żoliborz through the northern railway line and the Cytadela fortress, as well as not capturing the bridges over the Vistula. The forces mobilized in the city centre also failed to capture the German-only area near the Szucha avenue.
• Area II (Żoliborz, Marymont, Bielany): Units here failed to secure the most important military targets in the area of Żoliborz. Many units retreated outside of the city, into the forests. Although most of the area was captured, the soldiers of Colonel Żywiciel failed to capture the Cytadela fortress area and break through German defences at Warszawa Gdańska railway station.
• Area III ( Wola): Units here initially succeeded in securing most of the territory, but sustained heavy losses (up to 30%). Some units retreated into the forests, while others retreated to the eastern part of the area. In the northern part of Wola the soldiers of Colonel Radosław managed to capture the German barracks, the German supply depot at Stawki Street, and the flanking position at the Jewish cemetery.
• Area IV ( Ochota): The units mobilized in this area did not capture either the territory or the military targets (the Gęsiówka concentration camp, SS and Sipo barracks located in former Students' House on Narutowicz Square). After suffering heavy casualties most of the forces of the Armia Krajowa retreated to the forests west of Warsaw. Only two small units of approximately 200 to 300 men under Lieut. Gustaw remained in the area and managed to create strong pockets of resistance. They were later reinforced by units from the city centre. Elite units of the KeDyw managed to secure most of the northern part of the area and captured all of the military targets there. However, they were soon tied down by German tactical counter-attacks from the south and west.
• Area V ( Mokotów): The situation in this area was very serious from the start of the hostilities. The partisans were to capture the heavily-defended and fortified so-called Police Area (Dzielnica policyjna) on Rakowiecka Street. They were also to establish a connection with the city centre through open terrain at the former airfield of Pole Mokotowskie. As both of the areas were heavily fortified and could be approached only through open terrain, the assaults failed. Some units retreated into the forests, while others managed to capture parts of Dolny Mokotów, which was, however, severed from most communications routes to other areas.
• Area VI ( Praga): The Uprising was also started on the right bank of the Vistula. The main task of the Area VI (Obwód VI) was to seize the bridges on the river and secure the bridgeheads until the arrival of the Red Army. It was clear that, since the location was far worse than that of the other areas, there was no chance of any help from the outside. After some minor initial successes, the forces of Lt.Col. Antoni Żurowski were badly outnumbered by the German forces concentrated there. The fights were halted, and the Home Army forces located in the Praga area were forced back into the underground. After the Soviets finally reached the right bank of the Vistula on September 10, the officers proposed recreating the pre-war 36th Academic Legion Infantry Regiment; however, they were all arrested by the NKVD and sent to Russia for interrogation.
• Area VII ( Powiat warszawski): this area consisted of territories outside Warsaw city limits. Actions here mostly failed to capture their targets.

An additional area within the Polish command structure was formed by the units of the Kedyw (Directorate of Sabotage and Diversion), an elite formation that was to guard the headquarters and was to be used as an armed ambulance, thrown into the battle in the most endangered areas. These units secured parts of Śródmieście and Wola; along with the units of Area I, they were the most successful during the first few hours.

Among the most notable primary targets that were not taken during the opening stages of the uprising were the airfields of Okęcie and Pole Mokotowskie, as well as the PAST sky-scraper overlooking the city centre and the Warszawa Gdańska guarding the passage between the centre and the northern borough of Żoliborz.

Wola massacre

The Uprising reached its apogee on August 4 when the Home Army soldiers managed to establish front lines in the westernmost boroughs of Wola and Ochota. However, the moment of greatest gains was also the moment at which the German army stopped its retreat westwards and began receiving reinforcements. On the same day SS General Erich von dem Bach was appointed commander of all the forces employed against the Uprising, and began to counter-attack with the aim of linking up with the remaining German pockets and then cutting off the Uprising from the Vistula river. Among the units to arrive at the city at that time were forces of Oskar Dirlewanger, Willy Schmidt and Heinz Reinefarth.

On August 5 the three German groups started their advance westward along Wolska and Górczewska streets toward the main East-West communication line of Aleje Jerozolimskie Avenue. Their advance was halted, but the Reinefarth and Dirlewanger regiments began carrying out Heinrich Himmler's orders: behind the lines, special SS, police and Wehrmacht groups went from house to house, shooting the inhabitants and burning their bodies. By August 8, some 40,000 civilians had been killed in Wola alone, though some estimates cite numbers as high as 100,000.

The aim of this policy was to crush the will to fight and put the uprising to an end without having to commit to heavy city fighting. Until mid-September, the Germans shot all captured insurgents on the spot. The main perpetrators were Oskar Dirlewanger and Bronislav Kaminski, who committed the cruelest atrocities. After von dem Bach arrived in Warsaw (August 7), it became clear that atrocities only stiffened the resistance and that some political solution should be found, considering the small forces at the disposal of the German commander. The aim was to gain a significant victory to show the Home Army the futility of further fighting and induce them to surrender. This did not succeed, but from the end of September, some of the captured Polish soldiers were treated as POWs.

Stalemate

“

This is the fiercest of our battles since the start of the war. It compares to the street battles of Stalingrad – SS chief Heinrich Himmler to other German generals on 21 September 1944.

”

Despite the loss of Wola, the Polish resistance stiffened. Zośka and Wacek battalions managed to capture the ruins of the Warsaw Ghetto and liberate the Gęsiówka concentration camp, freeing about 350 Jews. The area became one of the main communication links between the insurgents fighting in Wola and those defending the Old Town. On August 7 German forces were strengthened by the arrival of tanks with civilians being used as human shields. After two days of heavy fighting they managed to bisect Wola and reach the Bankowy Square. However, by then the net of barricades, street fortifications and tank obstacles was already well-prepared and both sides reached a stalemate, with heavy house-to-house fighting.

Between August 9 and August 18 pitched battles raged around the Old Town and nearby Bankowy Square, with successful attacks by the Germans and counter-attacks from the Poles. Once again, the Germans used demoralizing tactics: targeted attacks against clearly marked hospitals (reminiscent of Luftwaffe attacks against hospitals in September, 1939). German tactics hinged on bombardment through the use of heavy artillery (including the Schwerer Gustav super-heavy mortar) and tactical bombers, against which the Poles were unable to effectively defend, as they lacked anti-aircraft artillery weapons.

Although the Battle of Stalingrad had already shown the danger which a city can pose to armies which fight within it and the importance of local support, the Warsaw Uprising was probably the first demonstration that in an urban terrain, a vastly under-equipped force supported by the civilian population can hold its own against better-equipped professional soldiers— though at the cost of considerable sacrifices on the part of the city's residents.

Siege

The Old Town was held until the end of August when diminished supplies made further defence impossible. On September 2 the defenders of the Old Town withdrew through the sewers, which at this time were becoming a major means of communication between different parts of the Uprising. More than 5,300 men and women were evacuated in this way.

The Soviet army captured Eastern Warsaw and arrived on the eastern bank of the Vistula in mid-September. When they finally reached the right bank of the Vistula on September 10, the officers of the Home Army units stationed there proposed recreating the pre-war 36th 'Academic Legion' infantry regiment; however, the NKVD arrested them all and sent them to the Soviet Union..

Soviet attacks on 4th SS Panzer Corps east of Warsaw were renewed on August 26, and forced the Germans to retreat into Praga, and then across the Vistula. The Soviet army included the 1st Polish Army (1 Armia Wojska Polskiego), and some of them landed in the Czerniaków and Powiśle areas and made contacts with Home Army forces. Their initiative was however not supported by the Soviet High Command. With inadequate artillery, air support, and numbers, the landing troops sustained heavy casualties and were forced to retreat. After the failure of repeated attempts by the 1st Polish Army to link up with the insurgents, the Soviets limited their assistance to sporadic artillery and air support. Plans for a river crossing were suspended "for at least 4 months", since operations against the five panzer divisions on 9th Army's order of battle were problematic at that point, and the commander of the 1st Polish Army, General Zygmunt Berling, who ordered the crossing of the Vistula by his units, was relieved of his duties by his Soviet superiors.

From this point on, the Warsaw Uprising can be seen as a one-sided war of attrition or, alternatively, as a fight for acceptable terms of surrender. Fighting ended on 2 October when the Polish forces were finally forced to capitulate.

Life behind the lines

In 1939 Warsaw had roughly 1,350,000 inhabitants. Over a million were still living in the city at the start of the Uprising. In Polish-controlled territory, during the first weeks of the Uprising, people tried to recreate the normal day-to-day life of their free country. Cultural life was vibrant, both among the soldiers and civilian population, with theatres, post offices, newspapers and similar activities. Boys and girls of the Polish Scouts acted as couriers for an underground postal service, risking their lives daily to transmit any information that might help their people. Near the end of the Uprising, lack of food, medicine, overcrowding and indiscriminate German air and artillery assault on the city made the civilian situation more and more desperate.

Food shortages

As the Uprising was supposed to be relieved by the Soviets in a matter of days, the Polish underground did not predict food shortages would be a problem. However, as the fighting dragged on, the inhabitants of the city faced hunger and starvation. Soon horses, dogs and cats disappeared from the city's streets. The situation was improved by the Home Army units who captured several German army depots and started distribution of food through the net of public eateries. A major break-through took place on August 6, when the Polish units recaptured the Haberbusch i Schiele brewery complex at Ceglana Street. From that time on the Varsovians lived mostly on barley from the brewery's warehouses. Every day up to several thousand people organized into cargo teams reported to the brewery for bags of barley and then distributed them in the city centre. The barley was then ground in coffee grinders and boiled with water to form a so-called spit-soup ( Polish: pluj-zupa). The "Sowiński" Battalion managed to hold the brewery until the end of the fighting.

Another serious problem for civilians and soldiers alike was a shortage of water. By mid-August most of the water conduits were either out of order or filled with corpses. In addition, the main water pumping station remained in German hands. To prevent the spread of epidemics and provide the people with water, the authorities ordered all janitors to supervise the construction of water wells in the backyards of every house. On September 21 the Germans blew up the remaining pumping stations at Koszykowa street and after that the public wells were the only source of potable water in the besieged city. By the end of September, the City Centre district had more than 90 functioning wells.

Lack of outside support

According to many historians, a major cause of this was the almost complete lack of outside support and the late arrival of the support which did arrive. The only support operation which ran continuously for the duration of the Uprising were night supply drops by long-range planes of the Royal Air Force, other British Commonwealth air forces, and units of the Polish Air Force, which had to use distant airfields in Italy and so had very limited effect.

Western Allies

Limited support in terms of airdrops came from the Western allies; particularly the Royal Air Force, in which a number of Polish, Australian, Canadian and South African pilots flew, made 223 sorties and lost 34 aircraft. However the effect of these airdrops was mostly psychological, as they delivered much smaller number of supplies than was needed by the insurgents, and many air drops landed outside insurgent-controlled territory.

American support was also limited. After Stalin's objections to supporting the uprising, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill telegrammed U.S President Franklin D. Roosevelt on August 25 and proposed sending planes in defiance of Stalin, to "see what happens". Unwilling to upset Stalin before the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt replied on August 26 with: I do not consider it advantageous to the long-range general war prospect for me to join you in the proposed message to Uncle Joe.

Also of significant note was the existence of an American airbase at Poltava in Ukraine, from which an airdrop was made during the "Frantic Mission" in mid-September. However, this action infuriated Stalin, who immediately forbade all Allied presence in Soviet airspace. Thus all but one Allied airdrops had to be carried out from faraway Brindisi in Italy.

Airdrops

“

There was no difficulty in finding Warsaw. It was visible from 100 kilometres away. The city was in flames and with so many huge fires burning, it was almost impossible to pick up the target marker flares. -William Fairly, a South African pilot, from an interview in 1982

”

From August 4 the Western Allies begun supporting the Warsaw Uprising with airdrops of munitions and other supplies. Initially the air raids were carried out mostly by the 1568th Polish Flight of the Polish Air Force stationed in Bari and Brindisi in Italy, flying B-24 Liberator, Handley Page Halifax and Douglas C-47 Dakota planes. Later on, at the insistence of the Polish government-in-exile, they were joined by the Liberators of 2 Wing - 31 and 34 Squadrons of the South African Air Force based at Foggia in Southern Italy, and Halifaxes, flown by 148 and 178 Squadrons of the Royal Air Force. The drops by British, Polish and South African forces continued to September 21. The total weight of allied drops vary according to source (104 tons to 230 tons or 239 tons), over 200 flights wer